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REPORT OF LAW REFORM OF THE SUDAN
LAW OF
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Presented by : 1)Dr. Saeed
Mohamed Ahmed El Mahdi*
CONTENTS
AN 1)
Professor Cliff F. T/zompson**
This report consists of three parts.
Parts I and I I are based on Part I
I I, which is an analysis
of the current state of the
Sudan Law of Landlord and Tenant,
with reference to all relevant cases
between 1900 and April 1, 1969.
Part I :
Outline of Recommendations for the
reform of The Law of Landlord and
Tenant in the Sudan
..
Part 11 :
Analysis of the judicial Role in
the applica tion of the Rent
Restriction Ordinance, 1953
Part III :
The Law of Landlord and Tenant in
the Sudan Relevant Sections of the
Rent Restriction
Ordinance, 1953
...
A judicial Decision being evidence
of dilatory tactics by parties being
unnecessarily
successful
... ...
PART I
PAGE
OUTLINE OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
REFORM OF THE J.A\\ OF 1 AND TENANT
IN THE SUI)AN
(i) IM REFORM
A Rent Control Tribunal consisting
of a single judge of High Court rank
should be created
for the Thrc Towns of
Khartoum. Khartoum North and
Omdurman. Emphasis would be upon
both speed and justice in the
settlement of disputes between
landlords afl(l tenants.
Disputes conccriiing the ‘ maximum
rent’’ allowable would be determined
by reference
to a “standard rent”
calculation sill) mitted by two
impartial experts employed by the
Government. Appeals would be allowed
only on points of law, within a
narro J)rescril)ecI time—limit, to
the Chief Justic(’ or his delagatee.
(2) tECH N I( R i
Policy decisons are r( even for
technical reform. The analysis of
the current law of landlord and
tenant contained in Part III of this
report contains r6 Problem areas
which are im mediately ripe for
clarifying decisions . Many of these
problems arc the result of
conflicting judicial decisions.
Clarifying decisions will require
policy choices, such as whether to
give the landlord or the tenant
greater j)rotection of the law. The
choices may he effected by simple
legislative amendments.
( MAjoi REFORM
Basic policy questions about the
rents which ought presently to he
payable in the Sudan, and the proper
power relationship between the
landlord and the tenant cannot be
answered without proper
investigation. Such an investigation
ought not to be pro longed : 3
months is a feasible time-limit. A
Commission corn 1 of an economist,
urban so’ and a lawyer experienced
in landlord and tenant cases should
make specific recommenda tions
concerning the basic elements in the
1953 Ordinance, par ticularly the
standard rent scales, and the
grounds permitting eviction of the
tenant.
PART. II
ANALYSIS OF THE JUI)ICIAL ROLE IN
THE APPLICA TION OF THE RENT
RESTRICTION ORDINANCE, 1953
(i) PRELIMINARY POINTS:
(i) The Ordinance, like all
statutes, is ot self-explanatory.
The Courts have had to interpret the
language of the Ordinance.
(2) Reputing of cases has
made the in of the Or din,ance
available to the legal profession,
and to the public
(2) MERITS OF THE JUDIcIAL
INTERPRETATIONS:
(r) Many of the decisions
have sensitively attempted to bala
nce the rights of the landlord, the
tenant, and the general public.
(!) Many decisions by their
clearity of thought have effec
tively advanced the creation of a
Sudanese law of land lord and tenant.
( C OF THE JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS:
(i) Too often the courts have
unnecessarily permitted dilatory
tactits by the parties-both
landlords and tenants-so that cases
remain unresolved for years.
Introduction
(2)Too many decisions have decided
moot points without giving any
reasons, or by the uncreative
process of citing foreign cases
without applying an independent
judgment.
(3)Too many legal issues
have had unnecessarily
conflicting decisions, arising from
inadequate judicial co-ordina iton.
PART III
THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT IN
THE SUDAN
(Emphasizing the Judicial
Interpretation of the Rent
Restriction
Ordinance, 1953, as Amended)
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to
state the judicial established
the Courts of the Sudan between 1900
and April i, 1969 in regard to the
law of landlord and tenant.
*
This report is intended for use by
the legal profession and as
background for Sudan law reform.
Sixteen problems” ripe
resolution are specifically noted.
The pre-independence cases
included although their authority is
unsettled, because at a minimum the
Courts have considered them uselful
or persuasive
persuasive precedents.
The law of landlord and tenant
reflects both the law of con tracts
and the law of property. Most of the
decisions in the Sudan
interpretations of rent restriction
statute; a tenancy controlled
a statute may be viewed simply as a
contract which ha a
consi derable amount of its
content supplied by legislation.
* Th’ articl ad pt th
organization and mat in Thomp.;on,
The Su&,nLaw of L ani Tenznt and the
Judicial In.eerpretation of the Rent
Re8triction Ordinance, 1953, 1952)
Sudan L Journal and Reprte
(cited as S.L.J.R.)
411. Thet article covered th
judgments from January 1, 1956
through Decem ber 31, 19 printed in
th S.L.J.R. Volumes (1956) through
(1962). The present r additionally
covers the cases printed in Volumes
1 and 2 of the Siidsn Law R (cited
as S.L.R.) 19’)9 1940 (Oceana
Publishers me. 1969) and in th
Volumes of S.L.J.R. for (1983)
through 1967), and the unre purted c
for th p 1946— 1956 available at the
Faculty of Law, Univer sity of
Khartoum, and the unreported oases
from January 1, 196S to April 1.
1969 available at the High Court,
Khartoum.
ASPECTS OF THE FORMATION AND
TERMINATION OF TEN ANC I ES
Formalities
Leases of land in the Sudan may be
created in a manner which is not
strictly formal. i
Differing Versions of the Lease
Where a written lease is in more
than one language and the versions
differ, the authorative
version is the one signed by the
parties. 2 The “awkward decision”
needed if more than me version is
signed has not been required, and
the High Court has emphatically
urged prospective landlords and
tenants to consult an experienced
advocate rather than use the form
contracts on sale at shops. 3 If a
form contract was originally drafted
for use in a foreign country, then
reference to the law of that country
is considered as assistance in its
interpretation.4
Quasi- Easements
The lessee of a portion of premises
is entitled to all continuous and
apparent quasi easements, such as a
right of access; that is, the lessee
has a right to all those
quasi-easements which are neces sary
to the reasonable enjoyment of the
tenancy .5
Rescission Based on Fraudulent
Misrepresentation
An assignee of a lease may rescind
an assignment when the assignor
fraudulently, makes material
misrepresentation as to the
permitted user of the land or the
pending plans of the owner, even if
the assignee by being
more dilligent might have
discovered the falsity of the
representation.6
1. Mitwali Oginan Abul Naga
v. Sudan Government (District
C.nnmissioncr Kassal HC-CS-261-195l,
(unrep Th Di strict Cmmissioner’s
Office pr bred a I,ase for ths
plaintiff which he signed in the
presence of clerks in the D.C.’
office. The D.C. subsequently refti
to sign, and leased the land to
anoth person. Wat.;on, J., h1d th
the Gjvern,nent w hound by the le to
the pl. It might h’ argued that th
defendant, never having signed any m
a mnot b, eh rged with hrewh
of thi contract for a l I d ii t
think th principle applies in thi
country. Leases of land ar. freq 1
signed in n manner th tt j not
strictly form -1.”
2. Ta AbdelSayed v. Ahmed
Ha.him Baghdadi, HC-CS-235-1923, I
S.L.H.
227: Tawfik Doctor v. All
Hanidi, HC-REV.87 (unreported).
3. Ta Boctor v. All Ha,ndi,
note 2 above by Hayes, J.
4. Taw/ik Abdel Bayed v.
Ahmed Hashim Dayhdadi, by Bell, J.,
note 3
.i. .lutomobile Company Lt v.
Abdel Mutual Mohamed Abdalla,
AC-REV- 241-1963, (1965)
S.L.J.R. 86.
6. Bzbiker El Sheikh BaUm v.
El .Vur AbdaUa Sh and Another.
AC-C8-l87-
1950. (unreported):
AC-APP-15-l95 (unrep.rted).
Term uitiou und l of (‘ovenants
The landlord’s acceptance of a
tenant’s unilateral reecission of
the tenancy can be by conduct, as
when the landlord accepted rent from
a third party OCCl1j)yifl the
premises under the party 5 own namer
A notice by one of two joint tenants
of premises that he intends to quit
the portion of the premises occupied
by him does not termi nate the joint
tenancy, so that each of the joint
tenants remains liable for the
rent.2
A tenancy is not tczminated by the
occupation of the tene ment by a
trespasser : a tenant whose premises
in Kassala were occupied by the
Italian Forces from July, 1940 to
January, 1941 claimed the tenancy
was frustreated, but the Court held
he was liable because he should have
provided in the lease ag’ainst the
contingency.3 The Court said there
might have been a different result
if the tenant had attempted to
terminate the lease by gving one
month’s notice during the
ocCupatiOfl.4
A tenant may he depirved of a right
to extend a lease where he fails to
perform the covenant upon which the
extension was made conditional, even
if performance is impossible and he
has expended substantial sums on
improving the propertv.5
Tenant’s lmpro7lenients to
I’roperty-Effect of Termination
The tenant is not entitled upon
termination of the tenancy to he
compensated for buildings or other
improvements he has added to the
land unless the landlord has
expressly or impliedlv promised to
pay.6 The landlord’s express or
implied permission to the tenant to
make changes is not generally to be
interpreted as a promise to pay.7
When the tenancy contract requires
I . Jfrohim .1J El h’ini v. Rob
.4qeney d Others. AC- Rl -1961.
(196:1 5.L..J.R. l9L
2. Ahmeo’ Ha .-lbdel Moneirn
and Others v. (hartsto Papalexrs and
Ancth i. AC.C5.79-1936.
2 S.L.R. 192.
3. Kerork i v. A ii Yahia El
Yernani. A(’.I3EV- 14-1943.
(unreporO d).
4. 1(1. per Flaxnian. (‘.J.
3. .Uanoula Haqmanas v.
Nicole Petreides, H,ssa Heis LC 2
S.L.B.
373.
6. Mohs’.med .4bdel Latif Ali
Amer v. imperial Ottoman Bank, HC I
S.L.R.
137: Mustafa Muso l Ohandagli
v Abdel Rahnian El Beili, HC’ l1444,
(unreported).
7. Moharned Abdel Laetf Au
Amer v. Imperial Ottoman Bank, note
6 abcve (landlord’s consent to erect
( n f buildings W( ii h Ls.449 was
not an agreement to pay; l’ealo(’k,
J.,
also held that “typical
native dwellings” constructed frofli
mud do not “improve” property); Mus
Muse El Ghandagliv. .4bdel Rahman El
Beth, note S abve, (prerequisite t
leiaee’o right to compensation is
specific, tot morely ticit,
permission of landlord).
Compare Denis Cavadias V.
I8kaflder Ibrahim and Others,
AC-APP-62-1917, 1 S.L.R. 86
(landlord who terminated a t at will
is liable to his tenant cultivators
for work which improvP’ th value of
the land).
written consent by the landlord to
alterations, very strong evidence is
required to prove either a parol
consent to alterations, or a parol
promise to pay for such changes. i
The tenant does have however a right
to remove buildings which he erected
with the express or implied
permission of the landlord. 2
Termination and Tenant’s Right to
Prescriptive Title
When a tenant does not pay rents and
exercises other incidents of
ownership, a “time must come when
(the tenancy) relationship lapses
and a termination of the tenancy is
presumed 3’.
THE PURPOSE OF THE RENT RESTRICTION
ORDINANCE,
‘953, 4
The Ordinance’s declaration of
purpose states only: “An ordinance
to re-impose rent control”.
The judges have not often been more
expansive. The most important
statements are the following
Mr. Justice, Abdel Magid Imam: “ The
Ordinance was re quired because of
the insufficiency of premises and
the overwhelm ing demand for
accommodation. The legislative
intent, therefore is directed in the
main to limit the rents and to
control the right to recover
possession with a view to keeping
rents within the limit pescribed by
law, thus reducing a landlord’s
chance to profiteer to the minimum,
and raising the opportunities for
tenants with limited resources to
securly accommodate
themselves. 5”.
1. Saleh Hussein Badran v.
Catholic Mission, HC.CS-50-1920. 1
S.L.B. 131.
2. Mohamnl .4bdel Latif Ahi
Amer v. Imperial Ottoman Bank, note
7 above (on th hisis of th E law
applied); Mohanted Abdel Latif .41i
Amer v. Satti Mohamed Has8an,
AC-APP-39-1923, I S.L.R. 230 (in
accordance with native custom”-Dun,
C.J.); Mother Superior Catholic
Mission v. Heirs of Coma Bint
Ismail, AC-APP-13-1929, 1 S.L.R. 416
(whether landlord evicted tenant
with good cause or not, tenant is
entitled to take away
his building materials)
Mustafa Mu8a El Ohandaghi v. Abdel
Rahman El Beili, HC-CS-731
(unreported) ( in general accord
with native custom” . Plntt, J.)
3. Creed, C.J., in Yacoub
Aslanian v. ,Jovan Sola.kian, AC 2
S.L.R.
340 at 342.
4. Tho R’nt Restriction
Ordinance (13.XIJ. 1953) in Law8 of
the Sudan. \‘ol. 7, Title xx, S
tb-Title 7; haroafter cited as the
Rent Restriction Ordinance or
referred to na tho Ordininca.
Soetions discussed in the article
are included in Apendix I, b The
Appmdix incorporates subsequent
amendments, the most important of
which was 1958 Act No. 39.
.4slan Serou.ssi arid
.4aolher v. Derhedro Bros. AC-REV
(1961) S L.J.R. 174, 179.
Mr. Justice, Babiker Awadaila :
“(the purpose is) to reduce to the
minimum all interference with
occupants of premises “ I
The purpose of the Ordinance is
served, therefore, by (i) a limit on
the maximum rent which is lawful for
premises; and (ii) by limiting the
reasons which will justify the grant
of an evic tion order against a
tenant. A most important development
is that the expiry of the
contractual duration of the tenancy
agreement is not one of the reasons
for granting eviction-see the
discussion below under “Statutory
Tenant”.
Once a party 1i established a prima
facie claim, “his suit should be
heard as an urgent matter.” 2. In a
recent case the Court of Appeal felt
it necessary to criticize sharply
the delay allo wed by lower courts
in landlord and tenant suits 3.
“LANDLORD”, “TENANT”,
“STATUTORY TENANT”; PARTIES TO WHOM
THE ORDINANCE IS APPLICABLE SECTION
3, 4, 19. EFFECT OF ILLEGAL OR
VOID
TENANCIES:
It is clear by section 3 of the
Ordinance and by a 1967 decision of
the Court of Appeal that the
Ordinance does not apply to premises
of which the landlord is the
Government. 4
Problem (i).: In light of the above,
section ii (f) of the Ordinance,
which allows a Local Government
Authority a special right of
eviction, is anomalous and
presumably unnecessary, hut no
decison has dealt with it.
1. Heirs of Imam Ibrahim v.
El Amin Abdel Rah?nan,
AC-REV-53-1963, (l S.L. 228, 234.
2. Cumings, C.J., in
Polikhronis Chioti8 and Other8 v.
Fareeda .Molla,ncd Effat,
AC-REV-6-1947, (unreported). In
Abba8 Sabri v. Mahmoud ibrahim
Khalil, AC-REV-222-1968,
(unreported), Salah Eddin Hassan,
J.. said regard to eviction suits
based on personal need: Justice and
Ecjiiitv do demand their speedy
disposal”.
3. Kamal Ramadan and Another
v. Ahrned Zein El Abdin,
AC-REV-440-1968 (unreported). The
Court of Appeal said that the lower
Courts erred in not laying dowii
time limits for hearing opplicat i
as, end sh old nit hove adjcu3 n (I
the hearings for weeks or months.
The case is reporoduced in Appendix
4. Hussein Hamjd Hu88ein v.
Sudan Railuays,
AC-REV-l20-1967, (unreported
where Abdel Magid Imam, J., said:
“It is (lear that tde Rent
Restriction Or dinance does not
apply on Government premi and the
common law regarding landlord ond
tenant is the law applicable in such
cases.”
The Ordinance does not apply to
premises in unscheduled towns, and
the Courts have occasionally erred
by assuming the application of the
Ordinance. i.
The Courts must determine the true
relationship of parties where a
mortgagee in p leases the premises
to
the mort gagor, an action for
rent and a claim to a set-off for
expenditure is determined by the law
of landlord and tenant, not by
mortgage
law. 2
The “Landlord”
A trustee of property held on behalf
of other persons may qualify as a
landlord, 3 but one
of several co-owners cannot
sue as landlord in his own name for
eviction of a tenant on the grounds
of the landlord’s personal need
unless the other co-owners have
consented. 4.
A tenant who lawfully sub-lets to
someone can be considered a
“landlord” for
the purposes of suing the
sub-tenant for breach of the tenancy
agreement. 5
Where property is sold by public
auction the sale is complete when he
auctioneer accepts the bid, and the
buyer immediately qualifies as
“landlord” who can give a valid
notice of
eviction, although he has not
yet registered as owner of completed
payment 6
A landlord who assigns his lease
remains liable to the lessee for an
unlawfull entry by the assignee. 7
1. In I8mailSid Ahrnedv. AU
IlamadMohamed, AC-REV.614.1966,
(unreported) the Court of Appeal
overruled both the District and
Province Courts which had wrongly
assumed the Ordinance applied to the
town in question.
2. El Besh A limed El Medani
v. O8man ayyad, AC-GEN-7/4/C - 1934,
2 S.L.R.
88 (by Owen, C.J.).
3. Ahmed Mohamed El
Maggar v. Mohamed l Khatiin
Os,nan, AC-REV-176-1959 (1959
S.L.J,R. 64; see text and footnotes
8 an 9 in Thompson (1962 S.L.J.R.
411, at 414.
4. Abdel Salam Bashir and
Others v. Onier Mohatned Ahened El
Abasi, AC-REV-
646-1965, (1967) S.L.J.R. 78.
5. AU Salih El Barbari v.
Attia MahmDud Attia, AC-REV-64-l966,
(1957) S.L.J.R. 130.
6. Sa!jid Mohamed Baralcat v.
Ahmed Ibrahim El Nueriy, AC
(unreported). This is the apparent
rule; Salali Eddin Hassan, J., in
the High Court, asked for a
clarification, but the brief
judgment in the Court of Appeal were
not of such assistance.
7. El Rayah Idreea v. Midd
East Agricultural Company,
HC.REV.322-1963, (1965) S.L..J.R.
111
“Tenant” and “Statutory
Tenant” (Section 19)
The most important judge-made law
regarding the Ordinance is the rule
established in the Court of Appeal
by Mr. Justice, Abdel M Imam that
“upon the determination of a
contractual tenancy by a valid
notice to quit, the same is
automatically converted into a
statutory tenancy and the tenant
becomes a statutory tenant within
the meaning of section iç (i) i
The agreement between the land1 and
the tenant as to the length of the
tenancy does not bind the tenant,
beeause when the contractual time
for termination arrives the tenancy
agreement, even if the tenant made
“a covenant of unconditional
surrender”. 2
The wording of secton 19 is
excessively vague and certainly does
not require or clearly state the
rule reached
by Mr. Justice Imam. 3
Indeed, he does not argue his
conclusion from the language of the
section, but bases his rule on the
premise that ,,to hold other wise
would render the whole purpose of
the Act nugatory 4 This premise
seems valid, for otherwise a
landlord could pressure the tenant
into higher payments of rent by the
threat of eviction based upon the
contractual termination of the
tenancy.
Problem ( Should the Ordinance be
re-drafted to incor porate clearly
the protection to the tenant
provided by judicial rule of
“statutory tenant”? If along with
restriction ui..n rents there is to
be security of tenure after the end
of the contracted term should not
the Ordinance make this clear ? At
the present time section 19 is
unclear, and section ii (a), by
allowing eviction
1. ibrahim You8if AF.boudi v.
Hassan Abdel Ha/i:, AC (1960)
S.L.J.R. 112, 114.
2. Ha88aballa Salim v. Abu
Tila El Amin El Tiib,
AC-REV.18-1960, (1960) S.L.J.R. 137,
139.
3. Section 19 may simply be
providing fcr the effect of a
“holdover
tenancy.” When a tenant holds
over after the end of the
terminaticn date, and the landlord
continues to accept rent, what are
the terms of the tenancy? Section 19
pro. vides an answer to that
question by indicating that the
tenant becomes a “statutory tenant”
under the same terms as existed in
the original leaae. But this is not
the same as declaring that all
tenancies automatically holdover
after the end of the contractual
term and ccntinuc as “statutcry
tenancies”. Prior to the enactment
of section 19 in the 1953 Ordinance,
several decisions of the Sudan
Courts were concerned to define the
status of a hcldover tenant. See,
e.g. Dimitri Kyriazi v. Co8ti Zi8,
AC-REV-29-l945, (unreported) Tenant
as holdover tenant is a tenant at
will unless the landlord acquiesces
in the holding over; accepting rent
is acquiesoene); Cht A. Laziade8 v.
Ohatta. Kronfls, HC.REV-75-1950,
(unreported) (a judicial rule by
MeDowall, A/J, in relation to the
status of a holdover tenant, which
is very similar to section 19 in the
1953
Ordinance); Taw/ik Boctor v.
Au Harndi, HC.REV-87-1950,
(unreported (Hayes, J., obiter
dictum suggests that a landlord
should give notice to quo to the
tenant which would leave the tenant
with no rights except those securcd
by the statue; section 19 in
the l Ordinance, however,
ee1ns to give the tenant the same
rights as he had in the original
contract).
4 IIa Salim v. Abu Tila El
Amin El Tub. id., note 2 above.
for “a breach or non-performance of
any other obligation” (which prima
facie includes an obligation
regarding the termination date), is
also unsatisfactory. Moreover, the
scope of section ii (c), which
provides grounds for eviction where
“the tenant has given notice of
quit” is left in doubt by the
“statutory tenant” rule, and the
point of section 15 (which allows a
premium payment for the advantage of
receiving a lease of TO years or
more) is obscure (what advantage is
a ten year lease if a lease of any
length is con verted into a
“statutory tenancy” at the end of
the term?).
Becuase tenants in areas convered by
the Ordinance have the legislation
as part of the tenancy agreement
both before and after the
contractuaT period, all such tenants
are protected
by the statute. The Courts
have, therefore, indiscriminately
called any tenancy a “statutory
tenancy”. But Mr. Justice, Babiker
Awadalla usefully restricted
“statutory tenancy” to describe a
tenancy which has passed the end of
the contractual period. i.
This distinction is important in the
Court of Appeal’s con clusion that
“tenant” in the Ordinance includes a
wife living with her husband, the
tenant, when he dies. 2.
But a wife’s occasional payment of
rent does not imply the obligations
of a tenant; the
wife is considered the agent
of the husband. 3 Also, as “a
general principle a wife resides in
her hus band’s home as a licensee,
and when the marriage is lawfully
dissol ved, in the absence of any
express or implied contract of
tenancy, her licence to reside in
the home is revoked.” 4
A tenant cannot claim a longer
interest in the land than is
possessed by the lessor 5, and “the
tenant is estopped from deny ing the
title of his landlord even if he is
trespasser”. 6
In a joint tenancy each tenant is
considered a tenant of the whole
property and they are jointly and
severally responsible for the entire
rent despite any agreement between
the joint tenants respecting
occupation of the premises. 7
I Hcirs of Iniani jb v. El .4,,.in
Abdel Rah,nan, AC.REV53-l963,
(1962) S.L.J.R. 228, 232 .
234.
:‘. Id.; see text in Thompe
n. (1962) S.L.J.R. 411 at 41& s
paisgz&jh.
3. Jannet Shoueha v. Tagh’fi
I Eiaea ,Shcaal.a. AC.BEV (19€3)
S.L.J.1(
81.
4. Idrie Gadalki v. .4RUW
.1108800 iIC8allatfl,
AC-REV-l(’9-l9&’, (unupc3t(d) (by
Lindsay, C.J., with Abt: Ramu.t, J.,
and Lcrnsx, J., conctuzing).
3. Abd4 Gader MahmozuT v.
Ahnied llassan Rhalil,
BC.REV.16-lUSl, (Un r p
6. Au Awad El Khorabi v.
Sail!, Mohasned Salih, Kc
BC.RLV6-l263, (unreported) by A.M.
Attabani, J.)
7. Ahmed Haaaan Abdel
Monei,,, and Others v. Chrisot
Papaleacs ard Another,
HC-CS.79-1936, 2 S.L.R. 192.
Effect of Illegality on Ten
A statutory tenancy may arise even
if the original tenancy agreement is
under a shadow of illegality, i hut
a contractual lease where is wholly
tainted by illegality is void and no
statutory tenancy can arise. 2
RENT: “STANDARD
RENT”; “MAXIMUM RENT”;.
LIABILITY FOR REPAIRS
The “Maximum Rent” : Section 5.
Rents are restricted by section 5 to
the “maximum rent” which is the
“standard rent with any permitted
increases”. The formulas for
standard rent” calculation in
section 4 depend primarily on
whether premises are “old”
(construction began before January,
i, 1947) or “new” (construction
began after December, 31, 1964), and
“permitted increases” include
amounts for “improvements or
structural repairs of the premises
“under section 6. 3
The “Standard Rent” : Se 4
The difficulty about calculating the
“standard rent” portion of the
maximum rent is that the three main
categories of premises in section 4
(a), (b) (c) which provide rent
calculation formulas leave out a
variety of premises. The premises
which do not fit into one of the
three main calculation categories
are by section 4 (d), to have “such
rent as the Province Authority may
approve”. This includes, for
example, the case of ‘ premises”
that did not have a tenant on July,
I,
1951. 4
The potential confusion of the
categories is illustrated by the
that the Court of Appeal 5 reversed
a High Court decision 6 and held
that rent for all or any portion of
“new premises” was to follow the
formula of section 4 (b) without the
possibility of a flexible
formulation of rent by the Province
Authority under section 4 (d), based
upon the different rental qualities
of portions of “new” buildings.
1. A’ma El Mu/ti Shakir and
Others V. Jo8eph Tabet,
HC-REV-46-1967, (1957) S.L.J.R. 83;
AC-REV-132.1958,
(1958) S.L.J.R. 55. See text
at P. 415 and footnote 15 in
Thompson, (1962, S.L.J.R. 411.
2. Rab GoudMohamedv. Haufz
BintMoharned, AC-REV-225-1959
(1961)S.L.J.R.
166, 169 (by A.M. Imam, J.),
see text at p. 416 in Thompson,
(1962) S.L.J.R.
411.
3. Other sections are also
relevant, such as section 16 (
limitaticn on rent of furnished
houses
).
4. Ahmed Mohamed Abba8her v.
El Hadi El Hag El Amin,
AC-REV-367-1960 (1962) S.L.J.R. 81.
5. Mohame4 Ahmed El Bireir v.
Mvtvsam El Tagalaws,,AC-REV-146-1961
(1963) S.L.J.R. 124 (By B.
Awadalla J.)
6. Soferian and Co. Ltd. V.
Internatio,uil Trading Co.,
HC-REV-186-1960 (1961) S.L.J.B. 219
(by A.M. Imam, 3.). See the text in
Thompson, (1962) S.L.J.R. 411, at p
417 for background.
The “standard rent” calculation is
imposed on the parties by the
Ordinance, and cannot be altered by
any form of agreement between the
parties. i The calculation of
standard rent on the basis of an
analogy with a separate suit is
improper, 2 and a previous judgment
in regard to the standard rent of
premises is nc t res judicata unless
the calculation was done in
accordance with the provisions of
the Ordinance. 3 The burden of proof
rests upon the landlord. 4
The “ cost price of the construction
“ in the formulas in sec tion 4
means the cost price at the time of
the construction without any
deduction for subsequent
depreciation.
Reconstruction of “ Old Premises “ :
Sections 4, ii (g), 6 (a)
“Old premises” which are
demolished and rebuilt within the
“new” period are “new premises” and
rent is calculated accord ingly
under section 4 (b). 5
Problem ( : Should the above rule be
limited to situation, found in the
deciding case, where there is no
tenant at the time of the
reconstruction ? If there had been a
tenant in possession, the landlord
would have had to gain temporary
possession under section i:r (g),
the proviso of which limits the
increase in rent to the amount
allowed by section 6 (a). The
difference is that the new standard
rent under this procedure could be
considerably less than that allowed
by a calculation under section 4
(b). 6
“ Rates” (Sections 4, 6 (b),
9) as Part of the “Maximum Rent”
(Section 5)
The calculation of standard rent
which is within section 4 (a) (i.e.
“old premises” of which there was a
tenant on July I, 1951) should
include the amount of rates if the
tenant was obliged to
1. Saad Hanna v. helen Adam
Papadaw, AC-REV-145-1957, (1963)
S.L.J.R.
12; Mohamed El Amin Mohamed
Au v. Mohawed .Fageer .Fadl, AC-REV-
542-1966, (1967) S.L.J.R.
189.
2. Ali Abu Zeid v. Heirs of
Ha88an Abu Moneim, AC-REV-112-1964
(1967)
S.L.J.R. 4.
3. El Tayeb Osman El Hadari
v. Yousif and El Gak Omran,
AC-REV-666-
1965, (1967) S.L.J.R. 101.
But compare Eadel El Seed Bakhit v.
Mohained Abboud, AC.REV-4-1947
(unreported) (Tenant cannot contest
standard mt three months after evict
icn based upon non-payment of rent,
because he shouJd have raised the
issue as a defence in the original
suit, which is res , under section
40 Civil Justice Ordinance, 1929);
Htesaein Khahl v. Ramass Ayyad,
HC-CS-381-1959 (1964) S.L.J.R. 88
(Tenant cannot dispute amount of
rent agreed in consent decree while
relying on that judgment in defence
to a subsequent eviction action
4. El Tayeb Osman El Hadari
v. You8if El Gak Oman. note 3 above.
5. El Amin Abdel Rahman v.
Khali/a Mahgoub, AC-REV-414.1959
revision summarily dismissed,
AC-BEV-290-1960 ,(1960) S.L.J.R. 204.
6. S the argument in Thompson
(1962) S.L.J.R. 411 at the top of
418.
pay them as part of “rent at that
(late “. i if any tenant in premises
which fall within the section 4 (a)
calculation agrees
to pay rates, the rates are within
the allowable standard rent. 2
Although there is no implied term
that a tenant will pay any in
crease in rents as part of
the standard rent, 3 the landlord is
en titled to collect increased rates
from the tenant under section 6 (b)
so long as he gives notice under
section 9. 4
Premiums “ (Section i as Part of
tile ,, Maximum Rent (Section 5)
Mr. Justice Mohamed Ibrahim El Nur
defined a premium as “the difference
between the standard rent and the
best rent that might othcrwise be
obtained. “ 5 The ,, difference “ is
a capital sum v section i allows the
landlord to collect from the ten an
for io years or longer. The presumed
reason for the Ordin ance’s
permission is that the premium is
justified by the privilege of the
tenant obtaining a long lease. 6
That a payment for a lease of less
than ten years is called a
a “premium” will not render it
unpavable if in fact it and the
agreed rent are within the amount of
standard rent determined by
a calculation based on section 4. 7
But a “premium” payable
on a ten year or longer lease will
not be automatically permitted
and will be struck down if the
rental
aspect of it is apparent. 8
Problem ( : Because of the rule that
a tenancy for an agreed duration
will not end but shall continue as a
statutory tenancy, 9 the
justification for the allowance by
section 15 of a premium for lease of
ten years or more appears obscure.
If the Ordinance were repealed, the
long lease would be an advantage,
but does this un likely possibility
or any other reason retention of
section 15
?
J. AU El Sayed El Kobani v. Hejr of
4hmt’d El iiJa1id Ac-REv.:31e-)9W,
(1960) S.L.J.R. 255.
2. Costi8 Trizie. Ltd. y.
Idrie Ah,ned El Khangi, AC-BEV (1960)
8.L.J.R. 219, 224.
3. Boo iiote 1 abov,’, at 256.
4. Id., and AU Mohamed El Hag
v. lbrahini El Sayed 4/,,md.
A(’-14E\-66-
1967, (unreported).
5. fjaafar Ahmed Hamad v.
Town Clerk, Kliartotin,
1 AC-1 (unreported).
6. See Sir El Khatim and
Another v. Nagib lbrahjn, El Yes.
HC-REV-7-1959 (1956) 8.L.J.R. 93, 95
(by M.A. Heasib. J.)
7. See note 5 above.
S. See note 6 above, and Thmnpson
(1962) 8.L.J.R. 411 at the top of
419.
9. Bee notee 1 and 2
p. 116
Good and Tenantable Repair” (Section
4) and “ Improvements or Structural
Repairs “ (Section 6 (a)
The landlord is entitled under
section 6 (a) to increase the
standard rent for completing
“improvements or structural repairs,
“ but he is not permitted to
increase the standard rent for
keeping the premises “in good and
tenantable repair” (sectior.. 4). i
The distinction is that “ structural
repairs “ (section 6 (a) are “
something new for the benefit of the
occupier, something that was not
there originally,
as distinct from the
replacement of some thing that was
already there but has become
dilapidated or worn out”. 2
The landlord may use first-class
materials for “ structural re pairs
“ although unnecessary if they are
reasonable “to satisfy modern
standards in a first-class area of
the city “. 3 No increase in
standard rent on the basis of such
repairs is possible until the
landlord has incurred expenditure. 4
The liability for repairs to keep
the premises in “good and tenantable
repair” may be determined
by the parties in the ten
ancy agreement. In the absence of
express agreement a 1951 de cision
states that the liability for
repairs in uncontrolled premises
rests upon the tenant, 5 but for
controlled premises section 4 of the
1953 Ordinance makes the landlord
“responsible
“.
The tenant may recover from the
landlord the expenditures he has
made for repairs for which the
landlord is responsible under
section 4, but not for expenditures
on what amount to “structural
repairs “ under section 6 (a) 6 The
tenant’s right of recovery does not
include self-help by refusal to pay
rent while remaining in occupation.
7
1. Zareef Saleeb v. Heirs of
Mohamed El Sayed El Barbary,
AC.REV-34-1965, (1966) S.L.J.R. 130.
2. Id., at 113 by Osman El
Tayeb, J.
3. Costie Trizis,
Ltd. v. Idri8 Ahmed El
.Khangi, note lp.l2 above, at 223,
by M. A. Abu Rannat, C.J. with MA.
Hassib, J. concurring. See discumion
in Thompson, (1962) S.L.J.R. 411, at
419.
4. Oaman Musa v. Abdel Mageed
Mohamed, BC.REV-51-1947, (unreported).
5. Muatafa Oaman El (labani
v. El Jak All Gable, HC.
CS-1123-1951, (unrepor. ted). “This
would seem common sense, for there
is nothing to prevent the parties
from defining their ropsective
liabilities by covenant.. .and it s
the tenant who is in inunadiate
physical control of the premises for
the period of the leave.,, . Bodily,
J.).
6. El Naima Mohamed El Igeüi
v. Saeed ObeidaUa, AC.REV-25-1961,
(1963) S.L.J.R. 186 (A tenant “must
be content with the state of the
premises se taken over by him and he
csnnoe by unilateral action elevate
the standard of the house...” - B.
Awadalla, J.)
7. (l.A. Contomichajo. v. El
Rayed Mohamed AU, HC.CS.162-1929, 1
S.L.B. 4”7.
Requirement of Notice to Validate
Increases of Rent (Section 9)
The landlord must strictly meet the
notive and- time require ments of
section 9 before being allowed an
increased standard rent. i Even if
the tenant agreed to increases of
rent which were permissible under
the Ordinance, the standard rent was
not legally increased unless proper
notice was given under section 9,
and any such increase therefore was
never lawfully due. 2
Section 10 A : Calculation of 20 per
cent Reduction of Rent for” New
Premises “ (Section 4 (b)
Problem (5) The extraordinarily poor
wording of section ioA appears to
make the 20 per cent reduction of
rent for tenants of “new premises “
ineffective. 3 Two ambiguous
decisions of the High Court have not
dispelled this impression.
4 However, it remains open to
the Court of Appeal to adopt the
suggestion that the 20 per cent
reduction alters the “ standard Rent
“ definition for “ new premises “ in
section 4 (b). 5 Therefore, the
landlord’s right in the proviso to
demand the “maximum
rent” would be affected by
the re-definition of “standard Rent
“, but the pro viso would have
meaning as an indication that a
contractual rent below the amount
permitted by the altered definition
of section 4
(b) cannot be further
reduced. Alternatively,
the legislative auth ority
could easily re-write section ioA to
achieve a 20 per cent reduction on “
new premises ‘. 6
The Effect of the Tenant’s Right to
Demand a Written Statement of the
Standard Rent from the Landlord :
Section 17
Ii the tenant under
section 17 has made a request
from the landlord for a statement of
the standard rent, 7 and has not re
1. Moharain Abdel I’ v. Hunna
Nawoom Mou8alti, HC.REV-512-1963,
(1965) S.L.J.R. 116.
2. Habeeb Kohein v. The
African Commercial Company,
AC-REV-232-1964
(1966) S.L.J.R. 68, 71 (by
Osman El Tayeb, 3.).
3. Note of this popular
belief and the suggestion of an
interprctaticn which would give the
section meaning is made in Thompson,
Vol. 1 of Lamp Law of the Sudan
(1965) p. 148.
4. El Amin Abdel Rahman v.
Khalifa Mahgoub, HC-REV-414-1959,
(1960) S.L.J.R. 204; Ibrahirn Yousif
Bedri v. Cairo Univer8ity of
Khartoum, HO CS-523-1959, (1964)
S.L.J.R. 91. Both judgments are by
Osman El Tayeb,
5. Thompson, id., note 3
above, and in (1962) S.L.J.R. 411,
420: and Abu Samra, The Rent
Restriction Ordinance, 1953, 8. IOA
a amen&d 1958, (1967)
S.L.J.R. 250, a very useful
contribution.
See, e.g., Abu-Samra, id., at 257.
For an example of a Court’s decisicn
as to whether a tenant’B request was
a proper notice under section 17,
see Moharned El Arnin Moha AU
v. Mohamed Fageer Fadl,
AC-REV.542.1966, (1967) S.L.J.R.
189, 191. A certificate by an
architect mder section 17 cannot be
relid upon in Court without giving
the tenant an opportunity to
cress-examine the architect Saad
Hanna v. Helen 4 dam Papadam,
AC-REV-145-l957, (1963) S.L.J.R. 15.
ceived a reply, there are no grounds
for eviction based upon non payment
of “ any rent lawfully due” under
section ii (a). r
Problem (6) : If the tenant has not
requested a statement of the
standard rent, and the landlord sues
to recover unpaid rent due under the
tenancy agreement, can the tenant
raise the defence that t |